Turns Out Feds Actually Tracked Most International Calls For Nearly A Decade Before 9/11 — Didn’t Stop The Attack
April 7, 2015
from the well,-look-at-that dept
One of the big arguments trotted out repeatedly by surveillance state defenders concerning the NSA’s Section 215 program to collect records on all phone calls is that such a thing “would have prevented 9/11” if it had been in place at the time. Here’s former FBI boss Robert Mueller making just that argument right after the initial Snowden leaks. Here’s Dianne Feinstein making the argument that if we had that phone tracking program before September 11th, we could have stopped the attacks. And here’s former NSA top lawyer and still top NSA supporter Stewart Baker arguing that the program is necessary because the lack of such a program failed to stop 9/11.
Except, it turns out, the feds did have just such a program prior to 9/11 — run by the DEA. As you may recall, back in January it was revealed that the DEAhad its own database of phone call metadata of nearly all calls from inside the US to foreign countries. Brad Heath at USA Today came out with a report yesterday that goes into much more detail on the program, showing that it dates back to at least 1992 — meaning that the feds almost certainly had the calls that Feinstein and Mueller pretended the government didn’t have prior to 9/11.
The now-discontinued operation, carried out by the DEA’s intelligence arm, was the government’s first known effort to gather data on Americans in bulk, sweeping up records of telephone calls made by millions of U.S. citizens regardless of whether they were suspected of a crime. It was a model for the massive phone surveillance system the NSA launched to identify terrorists after the Sept. 11 attacks. That dragnet drew sharp criticism that the government had intruded too deeply into Americans’ privacy after former NSA contractor Edward Snowden leaked it to the news media two years ago.
But, you might say, perhaps the DEA didn’t share that info with the NSA. Well… if we go back to some of the NY Times award-winning reporting on the NSA’s surveillance programs from 2007, we see that it actually mentions this DEA program… and notes that the NSA worked with the DEA on it:
In the drug-trafficking operation, the N.S.A. has been helping the Drug Enforcement Administration in collecting the phone records showing patterns of calls between the United States, Latin America and other drug-producing regions. The program dates to the 1990s, according to several government officials, but it appears to have expanded in recent years.
Officials say the government has not listened to the communications, but has instead used phone numbers and e-mail addresses to analyze links between people in the United States and overseas. Senior Justice Department officials in the Bush and Clinton administrations signed off on the operation, which uses broad administrative subpoenas but does not require court approval to demand the records.
That’s from 2007 reporting by James Risen, Eric Liechtblau and Scott Shane. Heath’s reporting fills in some additional gaps:
The data collection began in 1992 during the administration of President George H.W. Bush, nine years before his son, President George W. Bush, authorized the NSA to gather its own logs of Americans’ phone calls in 2001. It was approved by top Justice Department officials in four presidential administrations and detailed in occasional briefings to members of Congress but otherwise had little independent oversight, according to officials involved with running it.
The DEA used its data collection extensively and in ways that the NSA is now prohibited from doing. Agents gathered the records without court approval, searched them more often in a day than the spy agency does in a year and automatically linked the numbers the agency gathered to large electronic collections of investigative reports, domestic call records accumulated by its agents and intelligence data from overseas.
The result was “a treasure trove of very important information on trafficking,” former DEA administrator Thomas Constantine said in an interview.
The report also shows how the DEA got this info from telcos using the simple process of an administrative subpoena, so there was no court review. Telcos could have protested and gone to court, but the DOJ urged them not to do so:
The DEA obtained those records using administrative subpoenas that allow the agency to collect records “relevant or material to” federal drug investigations. Officials acknowledged it was an expansive interpretation of that authority but one that was not likely to be challenged because unlike search warrants, DEA subpoenas do not require a judge’s approval. “We knew we were stretching the definition,” a former official involved in the process said.
Officials said a few telephone companies were reluctant to provide so much information, but none challenged the subpoenas in court. Those that hesitated received letters from the Justice Department urging them to comply.
After Sprint executives expressed reservations in 1998, for example, Warren, the head of the department’s drug section, responded with a letter telling the company that “the initiative has been determined to be legally appropriate” and that turning over the call data was “appropriate and required by law.” The letter said the data would be used by authorities “to focus scarce investigative resources by means of sophisticated pattern and link analysis.”
And, of course, the DEA kept this whole database of metadata a secret by… using parallel construction:
To keep the program secret, the DEA sought not to use the information as evidence in criminal prosecutions or in its justification for warrants or other searches. Instead, its Special Operations Division passed the data to field agents as tips to help them find new targets or focus existing investigations, a process approved by Justice Department lawyers. Many of those tips were classified because the DEA phone searches drew on other intelligence data.
That practice sparked a furor when the Reuters news agency reported in 2013 that the DEA trained agents to conceal the sources of those tips from judges and defense lawyers. Reuters said the tips were based on wiretaps, foreign intelligence and a DEA database of telephone calls gathered through routine subpoenas and search warrants.
As a result, “the government short-circuited any debate about the legality and wisdom of putting the call records of millions of innocent people in the hands of the DEA,” American Civil Liberties Union lawyer Patrick Toomey said.
Heath’s report also notes that the NSA metadata collection under Section 215 was very much modeled on the DEA’s collection that began a decade earlier. If there are any differences between the two it seems that the NSA was actuallymuch more restrained in how it used all the phone call metadata.
For one thing, DEA analysts queried their data collection far more often. The NSA said analysts searched its telephone database only about 300 times in 2012; DEA analysts routinely performed that many searches in a day, former officials said.
Again, this DEA program isn’t really a new revelation, but Heath’s reporting sheds a lot more light on how widespread it was and how it was used over the years.
And, also, as we are less than two months away from the big fight over renewing Section 215 of the PATRIOT Act, you can be sure that some surveillance state defender is going to cite 9/11 as a reason why we need to keep the program. Hopefully, people can remind them that it appears we had just such a program (which was even more widely used) at the time, and it did not stop 9/11.
Furthermore, Heath’s reporting shows that once the program disappeared, while the DEA claims it missed the program, it was quickly able to build a more reasonable followup by just targeting specific numbers:
The DEA asked the Justice Department to restart the surveillance program in December 2013. It withdrew that request when agents came up with a new solution. Every day, the agency assembles a list of the telephone numbers its agents suspect may be tied to drug trafficking. Each day, it sends electronic subpoenas ? sometimes listing more than a thousand numbers ? to telephone companies seeking logs of international telephone calls linked to those numbers, two official familiar with the program said.
In other words, targeted surveillance, rather than mass surveillance. As many have been arguing for years, there’s no reason why the NSA can’t adopt a similar program. So don’t believe the intelligence community and its apologists when they wrongly insist that such a mass surveillance program is necessary.
Obama Sides with Cameron in Encryption Fight
Jan 16, 2015
By Danny Yardon
President Barack Obama said Friday that police and spies should not be locked out of encrypted smartphones and messaging apps, taking his first public stance in a simmering battle over private communications in the digital age.
Apple, Google GOOGL +1.28% and Facebook FB +1.53% have introduced encrypted products in the past half year that the companies say they could not unscramble, even if faced with a search warrant. That?s prompted vocal complaints from spy chiefs, the Federal Bureau of Investigation and, this week, British Prime Minister David Cameron.
Obama?s comments came after two days of meetings with Cameron, and with the prime minister at his side.
?If we find evidence of a terrorist plot? and despite having a phone number, despite having a social media address or email address, we can?t penetrate that, that?s a problem,? Obama said. He said he believes Silicon Valley companies also want to solve the problem. ?They?re patriots.?
In the U.S., governments have long been able to access the contents of electronic communication, including phone calls, consumer email and social media, typically with warrants, through wiretaps and from technology companies themselves.
But the law that governs these practices is dated and doesn?t mandate tech firms incorporate such features into modern apps. In the post-Edward Snowden era, many technology firms have turned encryption and ?zero-knowledge? into marketing buzzwords.
The president on Friday argued there must be a technical way to keep information private, but ensure that police and spies can listen in when a court approves. The Clinton administration fought and lost a similar battle during the 1990s when it pushed for a ?clipper chip? that would allow only the government to decrypt scrambled messages.
That?s a notable shift for the president. ?He sounded more like Jim Comey than anything else the White House has said in the past couple of months,? said Stewart Baker, former general counsel at the National Security Agency, referring to the FBI director, who has criticized the tech companies? new encryption policies.
Security experts have long argued such systems would hobble many anti-hacking tools, leaving computers exposed. For instance, if an encryption algorithm has a master key, it is inherently weaker because it?s possible for an outsider to steal that master key and crack the code.
Obama must now choose between competing priorities: the security of private information, or the ability of law enforcement to gather intelligence, said Christopher Soghoian, principal technologist at the American Civil Liberties Union.
Earlier in his remarks Friday, the president talked about new efforts by Britain and the U.S. to fight hackers attacking private sector companies.
?How in the same speech can you talk about taking steps to improve cybersecurity and complain about encryption,? Soghoian said.
Baker, the former NSA lawyer, called that argument a ?red herring.?
?We expect companies to be able to help with this,? he said. ?That doesn?t mean that you always have to write bad cryptography.?
White House just endorsed CISPA measures, two years after veto threat
Summary: After last year’s hacks and cyberattacks, the U.S. government now supports controversial legislation that indemnifies tech companies from sharing private user data.
January 13, 2015
By Zack Whittaker for Between the Lines
The White House unveiled Tuesday an updated cybersecurity information-sharing proposal, which critics quickly likened to a controversial bill that failed in Congress two years ago.
With little fanfare, the Obama administration said Tuesday its proposal “encourages the private sector to share appropriate cyber threat information” with the Dept. of Homeland Security, which will then share it with other U.S. government agencies and private sector companies.
The administration said its proposal would “also safeguard Americans’ personal privacy by requiring private entities to comply with certain privacy restrictions,” a required step for companies to qualify for liability protection.
The law aims to allow technology companies to hand over user data, albeit with “unnecessary personal information” removed, in order to qualify for legal indemnity. The government wants companies to share data in the hope it aims to prevent cyberattacks from crippling tech giant’s networks, power grids, and other critical infrastructure.
The renewed call for better cybersecurity legislation comes in the wake of the Sony hacks, along with other high-profile data breaches last year.
The Obama administration has long sought strong cybersecurity legislation, but Congress has over the past three years failed to play ball. Following the Sony hack, the substance of the Obama administration’s rhetoric changed. White House press secretary Josh Earnest called the North Korea’s alleged actions a “serious national security matter.”
But one prominent privacy group warned, even with the privacy protections, the proposal “recycles old ideas” from older legislation — including one the White House threatened to veto.
“Given that the White House rightly criticized CISPA in 2013 for potentially facilitating the unnecessary transfer of personal information to the government or other private sector entities when sending cybersecurity threat data, we’re concerned that the Administration proposal will unintentionally legitimize the approach taken by these dangerous bills,” the Electronic Frontier Foundation said in a statement.
CISPA, the bill officially called the Cyber Intelligence Sharing and Protection Act, was earlier this week re-introduced to the US House of Representatives with very few changes from its original text when it was introduced two years ago.
The 2013 version of the bill passed the House, but failed in the Senate.
A copy of the bill has not been uploaded to Congress’ website, but it was posted online earlier Tuesday.
The new CISPA bill has vastly the same language as its 2013 version, which aimed to allow private companies to search personal user data of Americans to identify “threat information,” which can then be shared with other opt-in firms and the federal government — without the need for a court-ordered warrant.
Rep. Dutch Ruppersberger (D-MD), who introduced the bill, cited the recent Sony hack as a reason to float the bill’s measures again.
“We must stop dealing with cyber attacks after the fact,” he said in a statement.
He said the bill aimed to stop cyberattacks in real-time and enable authorities to trace back to the source of the attack.
The reintroduced version of CISPA mandates privacy and civil liberties reports, but government agencies reserve the right to include a “classified annex.”
“CISPA 2015 would provide for an even cozier relationship between Silicon Valley and the US government at the detriment of civil liberties and privacy for everyone else,” writer Rachael Tackett said on Tuesday.
A similarly-named bill Cybersecurity Information Sharing Act (CISA) made it through one of the Senate’s committees, adding yet another legislative voice to the mix. Critics of the bill, however, called it an “even more toxic bill” than CISPA.
While CISPA 2015 has yet to be taken up by a House committee, CISA will be voted on later this year by the Senate.
The White House said it aims to push for further collaboration on the proposals at a cybersecurity summit on February 13.
“As with any legislation, the devil is in the details,” the Electronic Frontier Foundation wrote.
Department of Homeland Security oversight report: DHS is a terrifying failure
Summary: Analysis: A report assessing the Department of Homeland Security since its formation in 2002 finds mission-critical failures across all five of the DHS sectors, and struggles to prove the DHS is effective.
January 14, 2015
By Violet Blue for Zero Day – Follow @violetblue
An extensive, embarrassing, and alarming Federal oversight report finds major problems with the Department of Homeland Security, detailing funds spent on spa trips, no plan for an Ebola pandemic, Federal guards untrained in weapons screening, incompetent cybersecurity practices and strategies, and little proof that the DHS is doing anything to make us safer.
The report’s “Dear Taxpayer” introduction states, “Based upon the available evidence, DHS is not successfully executing any of its five main missions. Many of DHS’s programs, in fact, are ineffective and should be reconsidered.”
One key finding states Department of Homeland Security “spent $50 billion over the past eleven years on counterterrorism programs, including homeland security grants and other anti-terror initiatives, but the department cannot demonstrate if the nation is more secure as a result.”
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Each assessment of the DHS Five Top Missions — Preventing Terrorism and Improving Security, Securing and Managing Our Borders, Enforcing and Administering Our Immigration Laws, Safeguarding and Securing Cyberspace and Strengthening National Preparedness and Resilience — is a shocking litany of failures and incompetence, corruption and disinterest, characterizing the DHS as an ineffective and inefficient program of questionable worth.
This week, the President’s new cybersecurity initiativesspecifically name DHS intelligence and information sharing programs — yet the report states that “DHS’s Intelligence and Information Sharing Programs Provide Little Value”.
The report says the DHS is “lousy” at cybersecurity, and stresses that the DHS is a “dysfunctional culture” — one outlined especially in an ominous section on DHS corruption.
It details misspent and wasted money on spa junkets, 99 percent of chemical facilities uninspected, a range of cybersecurity failings, and a nation protected by largely untrained government contractors who literally don’t know what to do if someone leaves a bomb outside a Federal building or pulls out a gun and starts shooting.
Another key finding is that “DHS spends more than $700 million annually to lead the federal government’s efforts on cybersecurity, but struggles to protect itself and cannot protect federal and civilian networks from the most serious cyber attacks.”
The report — “A Review of the Department of Homeland Security’s Missions and Performance” — spearheaded by (now-resigned) Senator Tom Coburn, a member of the Senate Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Committee since 2005, also expressed grave concern for the rights of American citizens under the DHS.
“DHS’s [leaders] must focus on respecting American citizens’ constitutional rights and focusing on the proper role of the federal government to restore and earn their trust.”
Senator Coburn explained,
This report is a comprehensive overview of oversight conducted over the past decade to measure how well DHS is achieving its mission, operating its programs, spending taxpayer funds, complying with the law, and respecting the boundaries established to limit the federal government and protect the rights of law abiding U.S. citizens. (…) The analysis is based upon independent information and evidence as well as oversight conducted by my office and other watchdogs.
Over a decade of counterterrorism faceplants
The report stated, “A review of DHS’s counterterrorism and domestic security initiatives raises a series of questions about the value and effectiveness of DHS’s programs.”
For example, DHS has spent more than a half a billion dollars over the past seven years on its program to create standards for and regulate the security of chemical facilities at risk of potential terrorist attacks.
But the program has experienced significant problems, and 99 percent of all the chemical facilities that were supposed to be overseen by the program had not been inspected as of June 2014.
The DHS has apparently failed at counterterrorism across the board.
The Obama administration’s intelligence sharing programs, a key piece of new cybersecurity legislation the President is set to introduce, are apparently standing failures.
“Independent reviews — including audits and investigations by watchdogs — show that DHS’s intelligence and analysis programs, including its state and local fusion centers and other information sharing programs, are ineffective or providing little value.”
The report details,
It is not clear that the DHS programs designed to prevent terrorist attacks — including its intelligence, information sharing, and preparedness grants programs — are making the nation safer or accomplishing DHS’s stated priority mission.
Likewise, DHS’s initiatives aimed at improving domestic security from potential terrorist attacks have a history of problems, and there are questions about their effectiveness or utility.
DHS’s technology initiatives and programs designed to monitor and detect chemical, biological, radiological, or nuclear attacks have not proven to be effective or cost-efficient, and billions of dollars have been spent on these initiatives.”
“Dysfunctional culture’ of spa trips, shaking bombs, no plan for Ebola.
One recommendation the report stresses as ‘important’ is that “Congress must give the Secretary of Homeland Security the authority to lead, manage, and reform the Department and change its dysfunctional culture.”
The misspending of DHS grant funds veers into the territory of ridiculous.
One 2012 report cited in the damning DHS review, “identified many examples of states and localities making questionable purchases with homeland security grant funds. Tulsa, Oklahoma used Urban Areas Security Initiative (UASI) grant funding to harden a county jail and purchase a color printer. Columbus, Ohio used DHS grant funds to purchase an underwater robot. UASI funding was also used to pay first responders to attend a five day spa junket.”
In the report, we also find out that the DHS lacked a department-wide border security plan until 2014 (which appeared after Sen. Coburn requested one from DHS in 2013).
The DHS doesn’t have a plan for an Ebola outbreak, either. “The American public became acutely aware of the horrific potential of a low-probability, high-impact pandemic or serious health threat during the 2014 outbreak of Ebola in West Africa, and the arrival of the disease in the United States.”
“Despite its responsibilities related to pandemics, DHS has only one pandemic plan, for pandemic influenza, and has not updated it since September 2006.”
Corruption in DHS border security divisions is a significant and well-documented problem, according to the review (and in the press). “In 2011, the DHS Office of Inspector General had 600 open investigations examining CBP employees. In 2012, the OIG transferred 370 cases involving CBP and ICE employees to ICE’s internal investigative office, due to the then-Acting Inspector General’s concerns that the OIG was unable to manage the workload.”
“A review of DHS documents made available to the Committee reveals that DHS has also identified corruption within its own ranks as a problem that must be overcome.”
U.S. taxpayers are told by the report that chances are pretty good that the person screening us when we enter federal buildings isn’t trained to screen for weapons or bombs — nor are they trained on how they should react if someone pulls out a gun and starts shooting.
(…) in 2013, GAO reported that one contract security company that FPS uses reported that 38 percent of its guards did not receive training to use X-ray and magnetometer screening from FPS, which is the process for screening people for weapons or explosives entering a building, and some officers who did not receive this training were working at screening posts.
In 2014, GAO reported that FPS still is not providing training for how to respond to an active shooter scenario.
The following excerpt describes how untrained Federal security guards handled a bomb they found outside a Federal building — by shaking it, and later leaving it unattended for three weeks.
A Department of Homeland Security OIG Report issued in August 2012 reviewed an incident at the Patrick V. McNamara Federal Building in Detroit. Contract security officers found a bag containing an improvised explosive device outside of the building.
The guards brought the bag, which contained a locked safe, inside the building. They attempted to determine the contents of the bag by “shaking and moving the metal safe inside the bag,” which contained the IED, and X- raying the bag.
The Inspector General reports that the security guards placed the bag and its contents at their security console for a period of 21 days.
Not surprisingly, FEMA is still a mess.
Similarly, oversight of the more than $38 billion that the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) has spent on homeland security grants — which were originally intended to improve our ability to prevent terrorist attacks — reveals that DHS has not effectively tracked how these funds are spent and federal dollars often subsidizes routine (and in some cases questionable) expenditures by states, localities, and other groups.
(…) For example, over the past eight years, taxpayers have spent more than half a billion dollars on DHS’s Chemical Facilities Anti-Terrorism Standards (CFATS) program, yet the Department has not set up an effective chemical security regulatory program or measurably reduced the risk of an attack on our chemical infrastructure.
The report also criticized DHS handling of the Boston Marathon bombing, itself described as a major terrorist attack.
In the reports and reviews after the attack, “the DHS review does not identify actions that the Department or its components should have taken to prevent the Boston Marathon bombing attack and provides few “lessons learned” or recommendations for how DHS can play a constructive role in preventing future terrorist attacks.”
The 12-year assessment of the DHS concludes that the DHS is less focused on preventing attacks like the Boston tragedy, and has focused its mission more on recovering after damage has been done — and lives lost.
“(…) the absence of an in-depth discussion in the “Lessons Learned” report about what additional roles DHS could play in preventing future terrorist attacks raises questions about whether counterterrorism — and specifically, terrorism prevention — truly is the Department’s first mission, and whether that mission has transformed into preparing to recover from terrorist attacks.”
Obama’s new cybersecurity plan: A foundation of DHS #fail
The report doubts that key DHS cybersecurity programs are doing… much, if anything.
The Department of Homeland Security is not solely or even chiefly responsible for poor cybersecurity across the federal government. The White House, including the Office of Management and Budget, and senior agency leaders ultimately must hold each agency and its personnel accountable for ensuring that federal networks and information systems are secure.
However, evidence creates doubt that DHS’s key programs for improving federal cybersecurity are yielding significant value.
The section on cybersecurity is titled: “The Department of Homeland Security is struggling to execute its responsibilities for cybersecurity, and its strategy and programs are unlikely to protect us from the adversaries that pose the greatest cybersecurity threat.”
The report’s section on cybersecurity is all bad news – especially for fans of Obama’s planned legislative cyberattack protections.
The chilling report on the DHS as a whole since its inception is more important than ever.
The DHS failings it reveals paints the picture of a nation incompetent at protecting its citizens and infrastructure, ill prepared to lead the world in counterterrorism — or cybersecurity.
The DHS was loosely thrown together eleven days after September 11, 2001. In 2002 the collection of many different Federal agencies under the banner of Homeland Security officially became the DHS.
The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) is the result of the largest reorganization of government in more than half a century. The reorganization included the consolidation of components and offices from 22 different agencies to create a unified department focusing on homeland security.
In 2015, DHS will employ roughly 240,000 people, and spend nearly $61 billion. It is the third largest cabinet agency in government. Since 2003, the Department has spent approximately $544 billion on its programs.
Congress has assigned to DHS some of the federal government’s most important responsibilities related to securing the nation, including terrorism prevention and protective security, transportation security, border security, immigration enforcement, cybersecurity, and disaster recovery.
Currently the DHS is in the middle of a funding fight between Republican GOP and the Obama Administration closely resembling a parental custody battle.
Senator Coburn commented, “One of the biggest challenges that Sec. Johnson and DHS face is Congress and its dysfunctional approach to setting priorities for the Department. Congress needs to work with the Department to refocus its missions on national priorities and give Secretary Johnson the authority to lead and fix the Department.”
Unfortunately, the current spotlight on the DHS focuses on the issue of immigration and border security — not the terrifying revelations in Senator Coburn’s report.
FBI oversaw NSA’s email surveillance program, report reveals
Declassified study sheds new light on the bureau’s surveillance activities, but much remains redacted
January 12, 2015
By Amar Toor
The FBI has been conducting oversight of the NSA’s email surveillance program, according to a declassified Justice Department report obtained by The New York Times, but details about how the bureau administered the program remain unclear. The 231-page study, obtained under a Freedom of Information Act lawsuit, reveals that the FBI began reviewing the NSA’s PRISM program in 2008 and developed protocols to make sure that the email accounts it targeted belong to non-US citizens living overseas. In 2009, the bureau began gathering communications for its own purposes and began adding new email accounts and phone numbers to monitor through the NSA’s upstream data collection program. Inspector General Michael Horowitz concludes in the study that the FBI was doing a good job limiting warrantless searches to non-American email accounts.
Documents leaked by former NSA contractor Edward Snowden have revealed much about the inner workings of the agency’s surveillance programs, yet there remain questions over which agencies have access to the programs, and how they’ve been deployed. The Times report suggests that the FBI has access to the PRISM database and has broadened its own scope of surveillance, though there is still no indication that the program was limited to anti-terrorism or national security cases. The 2012 Justice Department study is at times heavily redacted, as well, with all but one reference to PRISM blacked out, despite the fact that the program has been publicly acknowledged.
A lawyer for The New York Times says the paper may challenge those redactions at a later date.
More: USA and North Korea: North Korea blames U.S. for Internet outages, calls Obama ‘monkey.’ This after President Barack Obama promised the U.S. will respond. “We cannot have a society in which some dictator someplace can start imposing censorship here in the United States,” Obama said. “Because if somebody is able to intimidate folks out of releasing a satirical movie, imagine what they start doing when they see a documentary that they don’t like or news reports that they don’t like…” “That’s not who we are,” he added. “That’s not what America is about.” The president also said that the U.S. will respond to the North Korean actions “proportionally” and “at a place and time that we choose.”
National Cybersecurity and Communications Integration Center (NCCIC) in Arlington, Virginia, USA
http://www.dhs.gov/about-national-cybersecurity-communications-integration-center
